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Barry Maguire (2018) argues that there are no reasons (of the right kind1) for affective 
attitudes.2 ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to this’ thesis, he claims 
(p. 779). In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. 
 Maguire provides the following gloss of his argument: 
The heart of my argument is this: so-called reasons of the right kind 
for affective attitudes have a different nature from reasons for action. 
Reasons for action are gradable—they have weights—and they are 
contributory—they are incomplete parts of a specific kind of 
explanation of overall normative facts, such as facts about what you 
ought to do. But so-called reasons of the right kind for affective 
attitudes are neither gradable nor contributory. (p. 780) 
In §§1-3, I examine these purported differences between reasons for action and so-
called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are 
exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best explained by differences 
between actions and affective attitudes, not between kinds of normative support. In 
§4, I argue that even if Maguire were correct, the extent of the threat to one of his 
central targets—so-called ‘buck-passing’ views—would remain unclear. 
 
1. Competition 
Maguire begins with a personal case about the death of his grandmother. He had 
multiple reactions to her passing. She was suffering greatly at her death, and believed 
that death would allow her to rejoin her husband. This seemed to make relief at her 
passing fitting. But she was also the matriarch of his family, and had a wonderful 
sense of humor. This seemed to make sadness at her passing fitting. Of course, these 
considerations did not compete with one another. It’s not as though if the fitting level 
of relief had been identical to the fitting level of sadness, then the two would have 
cancelled each other out and he ought to have felt nothing at all. Rather, both sadness 
and relief were fitting.  
                                                 
1 All references to reasons herein are to right-kind reasons. Maguire (understandably) does not 
provide a precise account of the distinction, but instead distinguishes right-kind reasons from 
incentives, moral reasons and prudential reasons. I follow suit. 
2 All quotations from Maguire (2018). 
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Maguire’s other cases all build on one in which your good friend Andrew gets 
a promotion you deserved. Maguire says that it seems fitting to feel disappointed and 
displeased given your deservingness, yet at the same time pleased given your 
friendship. In a later version of the case, Andrew’s being promoted allows him to stay 
in his apartment, an apartment that, had he had to leave, would have gone to another 
good friend, Margaret. Maguire says it can be fitting to feel both pleased (for 
Andrew’s sake) and displeased (for Margaret’s). 
These cases are meant to illustrate one purported contrast between reasons 
for action and fit-making considerations—which are widely taken to be reasons, and 
which Maguire takes to exhaust the so-called reasons3—for affective attitudes: the 
former compete to determine what one ought to do overall; the latter do not.4 (From 
here, I use ‘FMCs’ to mean ‘fit-making considerations’ or ‘fit-making considerations 
for affective attitudes’, as dictated by context.)  
Maguire’s argument would go through, for one, if competition were a feature 
of reasons per se. But it is not. Consider a case in which I have a reason to push button 
A: it will save five lives. I also have a reason to push button B: it will save a sixth life. 
It should be clear that these reasons do not compete merely in virtue of being reasons. 
If I can I should simply push both! Obviously, this does nothing to suggest these are 
not reasons.  
Reasons certainly can compete. They would in the above case, for instance, if 
I could only push one button. More generally, reasons compete when there is tension 
of some kind between the options they are reasons for. The most obvious kind of 
tension, as just illustrated, stems from options’ being mutually exclusive.5 
                                                 
3 I simply follow him in this, though it is a substantive claim (see note 10). 
4 Competition is the first aspect of the contributory nature of reasons mentioned in the quotation 
in the introduction. Maguire connects the purported non-competitive nature of fit-making 
considerations to another purported feature: strictness. Reasons for action are non-strict, Maguire 
claims, in that they alone do not issue in an ‘overall ought’; what one ought to do depends on the 
other reasons present. By contrast, Maguire claims, fit-making considerations are strict; because 
they do not compete, considerations that make it fitting to feel some attitude do so all on their 
own, issuing in an ‘ought’. My arguments in this section and the next can be extended to address 
this claim as well (see note 11). 
5 The precise nature of the relevant sort of tension, and thus the precise conditions of competition, 
are beyond the scope of this paper. However, for illustrative purposes I offer one example of 
competition without mutual exclusion. Suppose that Bob is standing in the path of a trolley. 
Pushing button B will divert that trolley onto an empty side track. Five people are standing in the 
path of a different trolley on a third track. Pushing button A will divert that trolley onto Bob’s 
track. You certainly can push both buttons. But your reason for pushing button B—it will remove 
the danger the first trolley poses to Bob—is arguably only a reason to do so if you don’t push 
button A. 
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If Maguire’s argument is to go through, there needs to be some tension 
between the agents’ affective options in his cases—tension that would lead us to 
expect competition were the FMCs reasons. Maguire never says anything explicit 
about what this tension amounts to. But we know, first, that it does not stem from 
mutual exclusion, as Maguire accepts that it is possible to feel both attitudes in each 
of his cases. Second, he must be implicitly relying on some intuitive tension between 
the particular attitudes he discusses, rather than some general tension between 
affective attitudes. Consider: the fact that a friend you’re visiting is sick makes it 
fitting to feel sorry for her and makes it fitting to feel worried about catching her 
ailment. Cases like this would do nothing for Maguire, for intuitively there is no 
tension here whatsoever, and so no one would ever expect the reasons for these 
attitudes to compete. With all this in mind, consider the following passage: 
The simplest way for considerations to compete is for one to make an 
attitude fitting and for another to make that very attitude unfitting. 
Suppose you didn’t get some promotion, but your good friend 
Andrew did. You know that you would have deserved the promotion, 
but it is really good that Andrew got it. The fact that you didn’t get 
the promotion makes it fitting to feel disappointed. The fact that your 
friend got the promotion makes it fitting to feel pleased. But the 
considerations supporting these attitudes do not compete. The fact 
that you didn’t get the promotion doesn’t make it unfitting to feel 
pleased, and the fact that your friend got it doesn’t make it unfitting 
to feel disappointed. It is fitting to feel pleased and disappointed in 
these different respects in this case. (p. 788) 
Maguire begins here by identifying the ‘simplest’ form of competition, which 
we may call intra-option competition: reasons for X competing with reasons against 
X. We may contrast this with inter-option competition: reasons for X competing with 
reasons for Y.6 Intra-option competition is useful for Maguire because it always 
obtains (unlike inter-option competition, as illustrated by the button and sick-friend 
cases): reasons for X always compete with reasons against X because taking option 
X and not taking option X are always mutually exclusive.  
                                                 
6 We might further distinguish inter-attitude competition between reasons for taking different 
attitudes with inter-object competition between reasons for taking the same attitude towards 
different objects. We might also distinguish inter-level competition between reasons for taking 
one attitude towards objects at different levels of description. For example, there might be 
competition between reasons for running, for running with a friend, for running with a friend to 
the park, etc. All such forms of competition are arguably possible, but are not features of reasons 
per se. 
   
4 
 
Maguire then turns to a case in which an FMC for disappointment fails to 
compete with an FMC for pleasure. At first glance, this looks like inter-option 
competition between reasons for disappointment and pleasure. Yet Maguire surely 
means this to be a failure of intra-option competition; why else mention it?  
There are two ways to read Maguire’s cases as exhibiting failures of intra-
option competition. First, the cases might be read as suggesting that there are no 
unfit-making considerations for affective attitudes, only the presence or absence of 
fit-making ones. But if FMCs fail to compete intra-option merely because there are 
no unfit-making considerations for them to compete with, it is hard to see why we 
should conclude that FMCs aren’t really reasons. If (probably: per impossibile) there 
were some action against which there were never any reasons, that wouldn’t suggest 
that there could be no reasons for that action. 
More promisingly, we might take Maguire to be assuming that in each of his 
cases, the relevant attitudes are opposed such that FMCs for one attitude are ipso facto 
unfit-making considerations for the other—e.g., in the case described in the passage 
above, that FMCs for disappointment are ipso facto unfit-making considerations for 
pleasure. Maguire says nothing to defend this claim. Nevertheless, one might find it 
tempting, on grounds that these particular attitudes, though not mutually exclusive, 
are intuitively opposed. One might thus read Maguire as follows: FMCs for 
disappointment and pleasure (etc.) don’t compete, and thus either disappointment 
and pleasure are not opposing attitudes, or FMCs for these attitudes are not reasons. 
Given this choice, we should accept that FMCs are not reasons. 
But this is a false dilemma. To see this, we need to distinguish two claims. 
The first is that there is tension between feeling disappointment and pleasure full 
stop. The second is that there is tension between feeling disappointment and pleasure 
about precisely the same thing. With this in mind, consider another passage: 
The fact that your friend will be able to stay in his apartment makes 
it fitting for you to be pleased about the promotion, but the fact that 
the promotion wasn’t really deserved seems not to make it fitting for 
you to be pleased about the promotion as such. This is all plausible, 
but notice that we have again distinguished two attitudes both of 
which are fitting and that are perfectly compatible with each other: 
being pleased that he can stay in his apartment and not being pleased 
as such about the promotion. (p. 788) 
As argued, Maguire needs to rely on some tension between pleasure and 
displeasure in order to generate an expectation of competition. Yet, here, Maguire 
seems to be claiming just the opposite: pleasure and displeasure in this case ‘are 
perfectly compatible with each other’. The above distinction allows us to make sense 
of this. Pleasure and displeasure may be opposed such that it is in some way 
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problematic—perhaps even impossible—to feel both about precisely the same thing.7 
The fact that your friend can stay in his apartment might make it fitting to feel 
pleased about this aspect of his promotion, and therefore also make it unfitting to feel 
displeased about this same aspect of his promotion. But it is not an unfit-making 
consideration for feeling displeased full stop because, for one, it is not an unfit-making 
consideration for feeling displeased about the promotion as such. As Maguire himself 
makes clear, there is no tension whatsoever between taking these attitudes—opposed 
though they may be in this broader sense—towards different things, or even towards 
different aspects of the same thing. 
What Maguire’s cases illustrate, I submit, is not that FMCs are not reasons, 
but rather that the contexts in which we tend to think about reasons for action and 
reasons for attitudes differ, in part because actions and attitudes themselves differ. 
We tend to think about how we and others should act in contexts where the reasons 
for them compete, because actions are frequently in tension, and we need to pick one. 
By contrast, as Maguire’s cases show, we often consider how we and others should 
feel in contexts where there are no relevant tensions, because we can feel many 
different ways about different things, or about different aspects of the same thing. In 
such contexts there is no reason to expect competition amongst the relevant FMCs, 
and therefore no reason to think they are not reasons. 
 
2. Combination  
According to Maguire, reasons combine to determine what option to take overall; 
FMCs do not.8 Here is an example: 
You are a knight, about to face the terrible dragon. The dragon has 
sharp claws. She has the ability to swipe at you with the claws. She 
also has a look in her eye that suggests she might quite like to. Do 
these distinct facts about the dragon constitute distinct ‘reasons’ to 
fear the dragon? They are distinct considerations, to be sure. But 
intuitively they work together to constitute one source of normative 
support for fear at the prospect of being cut open by a swipe from the 
dragon. (p. 789) 
 
                                                 
7 I grant this merely for the sake of argument. If you deny it, then Maguire loses any obvious 
grounds for claiming that FMCs for one are ipso facto unfit-making considerations for the other—
a claim that, as seen above, is required to make sense of his introduction of intra-option 
competition. 
8 Combination is the second aspect of the contributory nature of reasons mentioned in the 
quotation in the introduction. 
   
6 
 
Maguire claims that, ‘[b]y contrast, you might have lots of distinct reasons for and 
against some specific action, say, running away from the dragon’ (p. 789). But what 
matters here isn’t whether you could have many reasons for running away from the 
dragon; it is whether the dragon’s sharp claws and murderous look constitute distinct 
reasons for running away from the dragon. I submit that this is neither more nor less 
plausible than the claim that they are both reasons for fearing the dragon.  
Maguire may be right that it can seem strained to claim that two 
considerations are distinct reasons when they are representatives of the same value—
here, whatever values make the dragon to-be-feared and to-be-run-from. This helps 
explain the appeal of his argument. Perhaps, for each attitude, all FMCs stem from a 
single source of value and this masks relevant interactions between them.9  
However, even if FMCs stem from a single value (one per attitude), there may 
still be clear cases of combination (and competition!). To see this, consider a variant 
on the dragon case. You happen upon a dragon with sharp claws and a murderous 
look (we may eliminate the prejudicial claim that the dragon is ‘terrible’). The dragon 
says, ‘I just want to be friends!’ Are these reasons for and against running away? This 
is debatable; one might claim that these are merely reasons for and against believing 
that the dragon is dangerous, and it is her being dangerous that would be a reason 
for you to run.10 
Settling this is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, I simply note that many 
would take these to be reasons for and against running away. If they are, it is clear 
that they compete to determine whether you ought to run away. And it seems 
perfectly possible that while neither the sharp claws nor the murderous look alone is 
sufficient to outweigh the dragon’s claim to only be interested in friendship, in 
combination they are; you ought to run. Most importantly, this is no less plausible if 
we take these to be reasons for and against fearing her.11 
                                                 
9 This fits well with a number of things Maguire says. It might also explain why there are no unfit-
making (as opposed to merely non-fit-making) considerations for affective attitudes, if that is 
indeed the case. If the relevant value is present, that makes the attitude fitting; if not, then the 
attitude is unfitting. This is interesting, but it doesn’t suggest that FMCs don’t combine. And, as 
with competition, it is an explanation that stems from differences between actions and affective 
attitudes, not between kinds of normative support. 
10 I noted above (note 3) that Maguire’s assumption that FMCs exhaust the so-called reasons for 
affective attitudes is a substantive claim. This point is related: if the ‘making’ in fit-making 
considerations is a metaphysical relation, one might take the view that what makes it fitting to 
fear the dragon is (say) her dangerousness, and that indicators or expressions of that 
dangerousness, like her teeth and claws, are reasons for fearing her, but are not FMCs. 
11 The possibility raised here also calls into question Maguire’s claim that FMCs are strict (see note 
4). I have waited until now to raise this objection because the FMCs discussed in §1 arguably entail 




Maguire argues that reasons for action are gradable—i.e., have weights—while FMCs 
are not. True, Maguire notes, we often say things like ‘You have more reason for 
fearing wolves than dogs’. But, he maintains, these are not really gradable reasons 
for an attitude; they are FMCs for a gradable attitude. That is, what the above claim 
really means is that it is fitting to feel more fear regarding wolves, less fear regarding 
dogs. The explanation he offers is that fittingness is binary: attitudes are either fitting 
or unfitting.  
Certainly, fittingness is binary. But it doesn’t follow that FMCs lack weight. 
The analogy with action is again instructive. Permissibility is binary: an action is 
either permissible or impermissible. Clearly it doesn’t follow that reasons for action 
lack weight.  
This doesn’t mean Maguire is wrong that FMCs lack weight, only that the 
binary nature of fittingness doesn’t settle the matter. However, the variation on the 
dragon case at the end of §2 does suggest that Maguire is wrong, insofar as it is 
plausible that the combined weight of the dragon’s sharp claws and murderous look 
make it fitting to feel fear, despite her talk of friendship.  
Even if one denies that those are distinct reasons, as in the case of competition 
the difference Maguire cites here is due to common differences between reasons and 
affective attitudes, not between kinds of normative support. Most actions are not 
gradable. I can’t push button A ‘a little bit’; I push it or I don’t. By contrast, affective 
attitudes are arguably always gradable; we always feel things to some degree. Notice, 
however, that in cases where an action is gradable—e.g., giving to charity—we often 
do talk about reasons as determining how much to give, rather than whether to. 
There can be reasons to give or not give to charity, but there can also be reasons to 
give $10, $100 or $1000.  
We tend to talk about the former when there is intra-option competition 
between reasons for and against giving to charity, or inter-option competition 
between reasons for giving to charity vs. for doing something else that is in tension 
with giving to charity. We tend to talk about the latter when it is settled that we 
ought to give to charity but aren’t sure how much the reasons support giving. The 
parallel with affective attitudes should be clear. Either FMCs compete or they do not. 
If they do, then as in the variation on the dragon case, they will have weight. If they 
do not compete (because of the nature of affective attitudes), it is utterly unsurprising 
and untroubling that FMCs always support some degree of a sadness, rather than 
                                                 
the presence of the relevant values—e.g., arguably it is always fitting to feel disappointed when 
someone gets a promotion you deserve, whereas it is not always fitting to fear something with 
sharp claws. 
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supporting sadness to some degree. They would only do the latter in contexts where 
their weight mattered, where they needed to be weighed against other considerations. 
Without competition, this need would never arise.  
 
4. Implications for Buck-Passers 
One of Maguire’s central targets is ‘buck-passing’ views on which various normative 
phenomena are analyzed in terms of others—e.g., value is analyzed in terms of 
reasons, or both value and reasons are analyzed in terms of fittingness. In closing, I 
argue that even if Maguire were right that there are no reasons for affective attitudes, 
it is unclear how troubling this would be for buck-passers. Begin with the following 
passage: 
Sometimes we need to make an all-or-nothing judgement about some 
relatively coarse-grained question, such as whether a particular judge 
is admirable. Perhaps you are Chair of the Town Admiration 
Committee and the judge is one of the favourites for the Annual Prize. 
Then you do the best you can. But this is a question about reasons for 
action. The question is not whether it is fitting to admire the judge. 
The question is whether you ought to give her the prize. Lots of 
reasons will bear on this question: how people would react either way, 
whatever precedents there might be, what the Town Admiration 
Committee rule-book says, and so on. (p. 802) 
Let’s assume this is roughly correct. One point of clarification: Maguire is right that 
the question is not merely whether it is fitting to admire the judge, but many of the 
reasons for and against giving her the prize will be the same considerations that make 
it fitting or unfitting to admire her. What’s more, since the prize is (in part) an 
expression of admiration, these considerations are reasons for and against giving her 
the prize because they make it fitting or unfitting to admire her. In this context, these 
considerations compete, combine, and have weight.  
 Say the fact that the judge carefully maintains consistency in her sentencing 
makes it fitting to admire her. This is surely a reason for giving her the prize. Again 
this is no coincidence: it is a reason for giving her the prize because it makes it fitting 
to admire her. As a reason for action, it will compete with other considerations, such 
as the admirable things her competitors have done. And it will combine with other 
considerations, such as the other admirable things she has done. In all of this, it will 
have weight. 
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 Now consider one of Maguire’s targets: a buck-passing view on which value 
is understood in terms of reasons for desiring.12 Obviously, if there are no reasons for 
desiring, this view is false. But for all Maguire has said, a simple amendment might 
be all that’s needed: perhaps we can analyze value in terms of FMCs for desiring, and 
these same considerations become reasons in contexts where we face questions of 
what to do. 
Following this thought, let us close with a toy view. First, for something to be 
intrinsically valuable is for it to be desirable for its own sake. Second, we have reason 
to take actions that promote value. Now suppose safety and beauty are both desirable 
for their own sakes. I buy an old house. The house is beautiful, but many of its 
beautiful features make it unsafe. How should I feel? Perhaps these FMCs don’t 
compete, combine, or weigh against each other. I should simply desire both to 
maintain the house’s beauty and to make it safer, to whatever degree each desire is 
fitting. But now I have to decide what to do, at which point these very same 
considerations do compete, combine, and weigh against each other. Perhaps, for 
instance, a greater degree of desire is fitting for safety than for maintaining the 
house’s beauty, and therefore I should renovate. This all seems perfectly sensible, 
well in keeping with Maguire’s thesis, and it in no way challenges the spirit of the 
toy view in question. 
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